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8 April 1966

FRANCE WITHOUT NATO

By

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

After World War II France was in dire need of assistance. This assistance materialized in the form of coalitions; military, and economic. By joining together with the North Atlantic nations, France gained military security capable of deterring the Communist threat from the east. Additionally, the three economic partnerships of the Six, the European Community for Coal and Steel, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Community, sponsored the rejuvenation of a defeated and unstable France.

Two decades of European peace and prosperity are causing the French to reevaluate the threat from the East and to question the continued need for alliances in which France is not the dominate power. The French attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Common Market are the indicators of challenge. This is a challenge for leadership based on the Gaullist aspiration to regain world power status, plus a passionate desire to be the initial link between East and West in Europe. Broadcasting the challenge at every opportunity, and refusing to be distracted or compromised in his belief of French greatness, stands the "man who is France," President Charles de Gaulle.

France has gained strength and power through her coalition ventures. Without them, in the past, France would be in no position to voice a challenge for independence and European hegemony. Without them, in the future, France would become a second class economic power. Standing alone militarily, France is no match for the power potential of the United States or the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, France has diminished or at least stabilized during the past twenty years. Additionally, France does not feel that the United States will close its nuclear umbrella that has been the major deterrent against aggression in Europe.

Based on the above assumptions, the French are convinced that their geographic position on the continent provides security whether or not they remain a part of NATO. As long as France is sure that the United States will seek to perpetuate NATO and West Germany will remain a member, little is lost by withdrawing completely. The trend that is already underway is predicted to continue. On the other hand, France without the economic coalitions has nothing to gain and much to lose. There is no alternate source of economic protection once the Market ties are broken, as there is in the military analysis. France will continue to seek advantages over her partners, but in the long run, will again become one of the Six. Expansion of the Common Market membership is also a likely possibility.

The possible withdrawal of France from NATO is of serious concern to the United States. The question is no longer one of "France without NATO," but what should the United States do about the coming crisis. Two courses of action are proposed: (1) attempt to reshape the alliance in a way that prevents the French pull-out, or (2) plan for an alliance without France. Reallocating command positions to permit increased European participation, accepting France into the nuclear intercircle, and granting NATO control of all weapons and forces assigned thereto, are suggested ways to tie France back into a strong NATO. The second approach is feasible, but expensive. NATO will require a new base of operations and its maneuver area will become more restricted, but such reorganization need not disintegrate the alliance. If the United States is determined to maintain a viable alliance with Western Europe, NATO certainly will survive without France.

FOREWORD

This thesis is meant to contribute to the understanding of France and her activities as an ally of the United States and Western European countries. During the year 1965, much attention was given to the proposition of NATO without France. The approach taken in this paper is to turn this question inside out and examine what happens to France without the partnership of European and Atlantic coalition allies. The time frame is set from 1949 till the beginning of 1966.

From the outset, it was deemed impossible to analyze French activities in NATO without examining the other major coalition efforts that have become so important to postwar development of France; the European Community for Coal and Steel, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Community. The influence of these coalitions has led to the development of an economic as well as a military evaluation of France to determine her ability to stand alone as a world power.

French policy has been moving rapidly away from the community concepts proposed by Jean Monnet and the mutual security ideals of the founders of the North Atlantic Alliance. The motives behind this anticoalition shift have been analyzed in order to reveal the depth and severity of the present crisis. No attempt has been made to disassociate the personality and policies of Charles de Gaulle from the policies of France since 1958; they have been accepted as synonymous since he regained power.

The future policies of France have been concluded after an analysis of her potential economic and military posture without the help of her coalition partners. Should such a course of action materialize, adjustments in the United States political and military policies toward France are urgent. Suggested policy changes have been included in an addendum.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"France cannot be France without greatness."

--De Gaulle

Coalitions in warfare are as old as warfare itself. Response to the call for help in time of attack must be prompt, plentiful, and decisive. This is as true today as it was in 490 B.C. when the Persian forces under Datis landed on the field of Marathon. The call for assistance by Athens was immediately answered by small Plataea which rushed its citizen army to Marathon. However, powerful Sparta answered that they could not march for some days because of a religious technicality dependent upon the proper phasing of the moon.

The Athenians and Plataeans under the leadership of Miltiades went on to defeat the Persians in one of history's most decisive battles. Herodotus tells the story of the Spartan arrival:

. . . there came to Athens two thousand after the full moon. So eager had they been to arrive in time, that they took but three days to reach Attica from Sparta. They came, however, too late for the battle; yet, as they had a longing to behold the Medes, they continued their march to Marathon and there viewed the slain. Afterwards they departed for home, commending the Athenians and the work which they had done.¹

In this example can be seen some of the inherent problems, as well as some of the blessings, common to all coalitions and alliances.

¹George Rawlinson, Trans., The History of Herodotus, p. 208.

In the modern time frame other great coalitions of allies are being tested, and by some, doubted. True, there is no invasion by an enemy, but in today's terms of reference a mere threat of war is comparable to the disembarkment of forces on foreign soil of the past. Who then would challenge the need for the coalitions that have been born of economic and military necessity and have served the free world so well since the close of World War II? President de Gaulle of France has analyzed the future of war in this manner:

. . . there are two possible kinds of war to consider. The first is a total missile war, in which case Europe would not be involved. The rockets will fly from continent to continent arching over the countries of Europe. What we do will not matter.

However, in the event of a conventional war it would be necessary to have an allied army. In such a war there would be one battle--the Battle of Germany. If we won it--fine. All would be well.

But if we lost it? Then there would be no more NATO. It would disintegrate, leaving a vacuum. In such a case France must have control of her own power so that she can withdraw it to defend herself. So that I can defend her even under occupation²

So spoke the great leader of the free French, the General who never surrendered, Charles de Gaulle, President of the Fifth Republic.

In every coalition, the various independent members contribute their strengths and capabilities to a common cause. National goals have a great influence on the degree of participation the individual members will exhibit. Certainly, a strong member nation

²Alden Hatch. The De Gaulle Nobody Knows, pp. 250-251.

can influence the direction of the coalition more readily than a weaker one. An ideal coalition is one in which allies can make complementary contributions to a common objective. Where small powers are joined together with larger and stronger ones, the direction of the group effort normally will be controlled or commanded by the major power. Allies of approximately equal power and prestige will experience much greater difficulty in reaching agreement as to leadership arrangements for the combined effort.

The North Atlantic Treaty and its functional component, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), followed an almost ideal development as far as military coalitions are concerned. There was a common objective; protection from the encroachment of communism into Western Europe and thence domination by the powerful Soviet Union. Nationalistic goals and individual nation sovereignty seemed less important than common protection through cooperation.

Each member contributed its strength and capability for the common good. To the United States this meant economic aid, nuclear protection, industrial technology, military materiel, and conventional ground forces. To Great Britain it meant sea power and conventional ground forces on the continent. To France it was a rebuilt army and a base of operations. To the remaining countries, it was strategic position on the "rim of communism," limited military and naval forces, and a willingness to cooperate under an umbrella of nuclear protection. Certainly, this was a coalition in which complementary contributions were being made.

The direction of the coalition fell to the strongest member nation. The United States, whose national power far exceeded that of any of the other members, became the unquestioned leader. This was in April 1949.

Today it is fair to ask, is NATO being challenged by France because it has reached a state of imbalance; too oriented to the military to deal with the current political, economic, and social problems; too Atlantic oriented to deal realistically with European needs and temperaments; too weak to do without the power of the United States; and too strong and prosperous not to resent American leadership?³

More likely, this is a bid by France to claim status of equality in power, and prestige, with the leaders of the East and West. The French position was succinctly stated by Alexandre Sanquinetti, vice-chairman of the French National Assembly Committee on Military Affairs when he said, " . . . It is the first time that an alliance has reproached one of its members for being strong. It (NATO) should be an alliance inequality--otherwise it is not an alliance, it is a protectorate" ⁴

Can France stand alone in the world community without the military protection and economic support of alliance partners? Is the

³James Reston, "America and Its Allies," New York Times, 10 Mar. 1965, p. 40.

⁴Alexandre Sanquinetti, Statement made before the Anglo-American Press Association, Paris. Cited in the Washington Post, 7 May 1965, p. A12.

challenge to NATO made from present or potential national power, past performance as a dynamic alliance contributor, or just false pretense and a dream of greatness? The purpose of this paper is to analyze France in the role of a coalition partner. The major concern is a military alliance, but modern military capabilities are too intricately interwoven with economic and industrial power to permit an isolated evaluation. Therefore, the position of France without NATO will immediately affect US political and military policies, but looking from the French side, the Community coalitions of the Six are of equal importance. Both aspects will be considered.

Can Western Europe hope to meet a threat from the East with integrated power attained through successful coalitions, or can we look forward to the day when France will arrive at the Rhine on the third day after the Battle of Germany, and "Le Grand Charles" will commend us for the work which we have done?

CHAPTER 2

UP FROM THE ASHES

Naturally, progress will not go without danger; no great change is effected without effort and setbacks. In Europe, the movement to unity has overcome many such troubles and, in my opinion, is already irreversible.

--Jean Monnet

NATO--THE SHIELD FOR GROWTH

At the close of World War II all of Europe lay in waste. In addition to enormous casualty lists in every country, many hundreds of thousands of Europeans had become displaced during the war years. Industry and communications facilities had been prime targets of aerial bombardment by the air forces of both sides. The struggle to achieve economic and political order out of such chaos seemed insurmountable.

France, although saved from total destruction by early capitulation, still faced serious reconstruction problems. Two thousand miles of railroads were out of business and only 2,500 locomotives remained out of 17,000. The great ports were in ruins. Dwellings totaling 452,000 had been demolished and 1,500,000 badly damaged. Over two million Frenchmen were still prisoners in Germany, and the Budget was a bottomless pit with 137 billion francs of income and 437 billion francs of expenditures.¹

¹Stanley Clark, The Man Who Is France, p. 206.

Two aspects of the peace were readily recognized as essential for survival; political stability and cooperation, and economic growth. Winston Churchill is credited with first recommending a regional integration of European states to help Europe regain its position of power in world affairs, but it was Jean Monnet who championed a Europe of political unity devoid of the chauvinistic nationalism of the past. Monnet believed in a unified Europe. The institutional method of government that it introduced would permanently modify the relation of men to their nation states. During the Commencement Address at Dartmouth College, Monnet captured the real meaning of unity when he stated:

. . . Human nature does not change but when nations and men accept the same rules and the same institutions to make sure that they are applied, their behavior towards each other changes. This is the process of civilization itself.²

Economic aid to Europe became a reality in 1947 under the well-known Marshall Plan. The initiation of the Marshall Plan led to the development of the first of many organizations that tended to bind Europe into a political and economic package--the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). It was through the OEEC that the Marshall Plan aid was administered. Thus began the spirit of cooperation among the Europeans and with the United States.

By February of 1948, the Soviet Union and the Communist fraternity had created serious problems for her former World War II partners.

²Jean Monnet, Commencement Address at Dartmouth College, (referred to hereafter as Monnet, Dartmouth).

The climax was the coup d'état and Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. It was then apparent to Western Europe and the United States that to win the peace, another facet of cooperation would be needed along with the economic and political--military. By 4 April 1949, in spite of the pressure brought against it by the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, which initially linked Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States in a mutual defense alliance.³

This document is a masterpiece of brevity and clarity in the realm of international agreements. Its major provision, as outlined in Article 5 of the treaty, is succinctly stated as: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" ⁴ Whereas the signators of the treaty felt that this would deter future Soviet actions and threats against the West, the seriousness of the international situation at the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, led the North Atlantic Council to set up an integrated military force, in being, and under a centralized command.

France, and Western Europe in general, now had its shield for growth--NATO. Aside from isolated flurries of activity, like Berlin,

³NATO Information Service, Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, p. 178. Three additional members have been accepted since 1949. Greece and Turkey signed the treaty on February 18, 1952 and Germany on May 5, 1955.

⁴Ibid., p. 199.

there has been no sign of a renewal of pressure along the long front line that the Atlantic Alliance holds from the North Cape in Norway to the mountains of eastern Turkey.

The size and shape of the NATO shield were decided upon at a meeting in Lisbon in February 1952 where the so-called "Lisbon Force Goals" were delineated. The precedent established in determining these goals was unique and points to the degree of cooperation and trust that prevailed within the Alliance at that time. The procedure was based on a detailed and comparative analysis of the economic and financial capabilities of member countries and of military requirements. Never before, either in peace or in war, have member governments of an alliance consented to exchange detailed and confidential information on their military, economic and financial programs, and to expose the latter to close scrutiny and criticism by their partners.

THE COMMUNITY CONCEPT--MONNET'S EUROPE

No paper dealing with postwar Europe would be complete without some recognition of the "Silent Revolution" that has moved Europe up from the ashes to its present position of opulence. The economic condition of France, and of Western Europe in general, is proof of the success of this revolution which rests upon the principle of delegation of sovereign powers of the nation states to common institutions. Two Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, stand out

above all others for their efforts and imagination toward the creation of a Federal Europe. It is interesting to note that it is also a Frenchman, Charles de Gaulle, who appears to want to reverse the many steps already taken toward a "United States of Europe."

Jean Monnet, the architect of the Community concept, recognized that no European State had a potential comparable to that of the United States or the Soviet Union. These two powers have the great material resources which modern technology and scientific progress demand, and which can satisfy a vast internal market. These are powers of continental scale. If Europe was to compete in such a world atmosphere, its peoples must be united and the nationalist forms of the past must be overcome. Only by making national responsibilities into collective responsibilities of the European peoples as a whole could world status be achieved.⁵

The task of welding Europeans into a homogeneous community that goes beyond ties of cooperation poses many great problems. Europe is made up of separate nations with different traditions, different languages, different cultures, and civilizations. The nation states have behind them a long past of mutual rivalries and attempts at domination.⁶ These aspects of nationalism have led to the development of highly independent industrialized societies which in most cases competed against one another.

⁵Jean Monnet, Address to Free Trade Unions . . . , p. 2.

⁶Monnet, Dartmouth, p. 3.

Monnet's major contribution to the Community development in Europe was his concept of Federal institutions. Federal institutions with powers to act and to enforce their own independent policies provided the only way to overcome the many divergent factors that existed among the European states. These institutions, to which the European nations delegated their sovereignty, made up the government of the Community, were collectively sovereign, and were authorized to act without the consent of member governments. To achieve this delegation, treaties were to be negotiated between the member states, signed by the governments, and submitted to the governing bodies of the countries for ratification.⁷

The purpose of Monnet's Europe was to provide a decisive break with the chauvinistic nationalism of the past. To be successful, it meant that Europeans would have to reject the theory that the nation state is an all-embracing entity. It demanded equal and respected partnership in place of fanatic competition.⁸

The development of unity in Europe was to be the first step in the general plan. Monnet's Europe begins with the European Communities. These transcend into a European Federation, an Atlantic partnership, and then a developing world order based on Community principles. In the Atlantic partnership Monnet sees America and Europe bound together with economic and defense agreements, thus

⁷Jean Monnet, Statement to Randall Committee

⁸John Pinder, Europe Against de Gaulle, p. 10.

reducing the risk of a resurgence of Soviet militancy caused by any split in the Western Alliance. When Atlantic solidarity has been achieved, Monnet looks for a New Deal for the developing areas. Here he would hope to create a partnership between the advanced and the emerging nations, based on the following elements: cooperation in the planning of trade and aid; cultural exchanges in the massive movement of people for the programs of education and technical assistance; and finally, a Community of Nations as the emergents gain strength and stature through the previous elements.⁹

THE SCHUMAN PLAN

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FOR COAL AND STEEL

Although several plans were proposed to abolish economic barriers in Europe after World War II, all failed due to reliance on cooperation without a system of control, or the reluctance of the member states to face the issue of Germany. The early postwar years found France with high hopes of securing the leadership of the continental steel industry. France resisted every effort of her allies to salvage German productive capacity and tried to keep German steel output restricted to five (later to 11.1) million tons annually.¹⁰ However, even with the difficulties which beset Germany, by 1950, only five years after the war ended, she had outdistanced France in coal output and was equaling France's steel production.

⁹Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁰M. J. Bond, Whither Europe?, p. 171.

It was under these circumstances that Robert Schuman, then Foreign Minister of France, announced the historic plan that bears his name.

Schuman recognized that the problem of unity in Europe hinged on Franco-German agreement. The nature of this agreement was to be strong enough, ". . . to make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible."¹¹ These requirements could best be met by an integrated economic scheme, binding France and Germany in a common venture for mutual gain.

During the war years Monnet had thought of the idea of applying the functional approach to some industries. It was from this planning that Schuman's Plan and the European Community for Coal and Steel (ECCS) emerged.¹² On May 9, 1950, Schuman proposed that France and Germany pool their resources of coal and steel under a common federal authority. The invitation to join with France and Germany in this venture was open to other countries that were willing to meet the Community requirements. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands joined and formed the so-called European Six. In 1952 the necessary treaties were signed and ratified by the member states and the ECCS was born.

The Community thus established under the federal institution concept was not just to pool coal and steel, but to be the first

¹¹Robert Schuman, Announcement of the Schuman Plan, 9 May 1950. Complete text of the French Plan cited as "World Document," Current History, Vol. 19, No. 107, Jul. 1950, pp. 45-46.

¹²Grove Haines, ed., European Integration, p. 51.

step on the way to European union. It is true that this in effect was a technical step, and its new procedures under common institutions, were on trial for the first time. France and Germany had been reconciled after three great wars, in 1870, 1914, and 1940. If the first step proved successful, it was to be followed by others. To seek the solution of the Franco-German problem first was a proper approach toward uniting Europe. These are the two most important Western countries on the continent and their differences have been the source of much trouble for all.¹³

The object of the Community was to create a single market, to promote economic expansion, to maintain a high level of employment, raise living standards in member countries, and to insure a more rational distribution of goods at the highest level of productivity.¹⁴ These and many other achievements have been accomplished by ECCS. The Community is accepted by national governments, producers, and consumers the world over. Many outside powers have sent permanent delegations to the Community headquarters. The federation of Europe is a practical possibility. It is possible at least, in areas which represent an existing and recognized common interest in a sphere which can be easily defined.

To many Europeans the Schuman Plan was the beginning of the United States of Europe (USE). The ECCS was an example of one of the federal institutions that would function as a ministry in the

¹³Monnet, Dartmouth, p. 3.

¹⁴Bond, op. cit., p. 175.

government of the USE. To others, it was perhaps just a means to an end. A step necessary to be taken for economic progress. A step that could be withdrawn when progress began to threaten sovereignty.

Even to the skeptics, the production progress of the ECCS in the first two years was phenomenal: 160% for steel; 60% for coal; 30% for iron ore; and 300% for scrap.¹⁵ Just as NATO had provided France and the rest of Western Europe the opportunity to rebuild without fear and intimidation from the Communists, the ECCS had given new economic blood to those who had committed themselves to the coalition.

THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY

After the initial success of the ECCS, no positive action was forthcoming to develop a united Europe. The most important event to influence Western Europe to reconsider Monnet's plan, was probably the Suez crisis in 1956. The failure of the French and British to regain control of the Suez Canal proved to be a stinging setback to the diplomatic prestige of these countries. This setback also made it clear to Western European nations that American support could not automatically be counted upon, in causes of which it does not approve.¹⁶ As is normal in a time of crisis, the Europeans sought comfort and help in coalition. Negotiations that had bogged

¹⁵European Community for Coal and Steel, Building a United States of Europe, p. 11.

¹⁶Harold C. Deutsch, The New Europe, the Common Market, and the United States, p. 9.

down, were given new emphasis and rapidly concluded. Treaties for the European Economic Community (Common Market) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were signed on 23 March 1957.¹⁷

With the Suez crisis as the catalyst, the formation of Euratom was motivated by a sense of urgency on the part of Europeans who recognized that their destiny required unity. Unity could be gained and maintained only through the development of major common programs. Major programs on the scale visualized required enormous sources of power. Since Europe was faced with limited possibilities of increasing the indigenous supply of conventional fuels, it saw in atomic energy an alternate source of power. Euratom, a new Community of the Six, came into being on 1 January 1958. Its stated purpose was to coordinate the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.¹⁸

Actually, atomic power meant more than just another source of energy to most Europeans. It was the product that was needed to insure their economic growth. This growth, which showed such great progress in the Coal and Steel Community, had to continue if Europe was to exercise her rightful influence in world affairs.

Shortly after its inception, Euratom entered into an international agreement with the United States. The program involved the construction by 1963 of six large-scale nuclear power plants based

¹⁷Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁸Dwight D. Eisenhower, Presidential address to the House, p. 2. The President not only wanted to inform the Congress of the financial role that the United States was to play in Euratom, but he wanted to emphasize the purpose of the community venture was peaceful.

on US-type reactors. These plants were to be built in the six Euratom countries, and financed by Euratom and the United States. Of the total capital cost of \$350,000,000, the United States agreed to provide long term loans to Euratom in the amount of \$135,000,000.¹⁹

The joint nuclear power program with Euratom is an extension of the US foreign policy. In Euratom, the United States can visualize further economic and social advances leading to a united Europe. Euratom remains today, one of the few organizations founded on the Community concept, that has survived the critical denunciation of President de Gaulle of France.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

As was the case of Euratom, the European Economic Community (Common Market) had its beginning with the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957. The principal provision of the Rome agreements with respect to the Common Market was the creation of a free-trade Community among the six initial participants. Of the Six already joined in the ECCS, all but France had made preliminary proposals in 1955 to extend the Community's function.²⁰ Of all the prospective participants, the French industrialists were the most pessimistic about the experiment.

¹⁹US Dept of State, United States-Euratom Program, pp. 1-3.

²⁰Rene Albrecht-Carrie, One Europe, p. 296.

It is noteworthy that what happened in Rome was purely an internal European development. Unlike the Marshall Plan of 1947, and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, in which the American and European motivation of defense was strong, the Rome agreement was born without American initiative. This is not to say that the United States disapproved of the concept, but rather that it had little or nothing to do with the formation of the coalition. The Common Market developed from "within."

The Treaty of Rome had as its final aim the total elimination of tariffs among the Six. Originally this was to be accomplished by December 1969. It was planned to reduce in three increments the import duties on almost all of the products the members traded with one another. The first two stages called for two reductions of 25% each over two four-year periods. The remaining 50% was to be wiped out in the final stage of four years.²¹

The initial results of the Common Market were outstanding. The first tariff cut in January of 1959 caused exports to rise sharply. After a leveling off period, which caused the postponement of the second reduction, exports again showed a sensational rise by mid 1961. A double cut was ordered on the strength of the trend, and by 1963 the internal tariffs of the Common Market had been cut 60% below their rate when the Rome agreements were signed.²² It is estimated that all tariffs among the members may be eliminated by 1966, three years ahead of schedule.

²¹Jean Monnet, Interview: What is the Common Market?, p. 34. (Hereafter cited as Monnet, Interview.)

²²Deutseh, op. cit., p. 12.

The Common Market with all its economic advances and increased prosperity has not been without problems. The major stumbling block has been the tariffs on agricultural products. Agriculturally, France is the richest country. France is pressing for the same tariff reductions progress on agricultural products as has been the case on the industrial front. This remains one of the yet unsolved problems of the Common Market.

Although the Common Market was conceived from "within Europe," it was the position of the founding governments that it would be a structure of broad European and Western significance. Other European nations, in addition to the Six, would eventually be included. Much later, it was envisaged that the Community would link up the entire Atlantic world.²³ As the tariffs between the Six are disappearing, many of the countries outside of the Common Market are concerned with the rising common tariff toward the outsiders. This situation, should it persist, would not only belie the intent of the founders, but cause great friction throughout the world of trade.

Although it was President de Gaulle of France who slammed the door on Britain's entry into the Common Market, France is not against expansion per se. On 20 July 1963 the Six entered into an agreement with eighteen African states to provide them economic assistance,

²³Ibid., p. 13.

capital investment, and preferential tariff treatment.²⁴ France vigorously sponsored economic links in this situation. The fact that all but three of the recipients were associated with the French Community of States may have been coincidental.

When asked about the Common Market as a stabilizing influence in Western European political activities, Monnet had this to say:

I dismiss the possibility of a major political upheaval inside any of the Common Market countries or among them. Despair brings upheavals. We have hope. The Common Market has already been a significant factor in stabilizing the politics of France, West Germany and Italy. Just take France during the Algerian crisis: Why did the vast majority of Frenchmen remain calm in the face of great provocations? Because they were not looking back. Or just imagine, only 15 years after World War II, German soldiers started training on French soil at the invitation of the French!²⁵

Since its beginning, the Common Market has proved to be a worthy economic tool for its members. Trade among the members has increased by more than 60% during the period 1959 to 1962. The economies of the members have continued to grow at faster rates than either the American or British.²⁶ As the process of integration continues with such success the powerful interests of private enterprise are becoming more deeply involved. As this ensues, the nationality of an enterprise may become impossible to discern. With such progress, the Common Market might reach the point of no return.

²⁴Jacob J. van der Lee, "Community Economic Relations with Associated African States and Other Countries," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 384, July 1963, pp. 15, 16, and 24.

²⁵Monnet, Interview, p. 33.

²⁶Albrecht-Carrie, op. cit., pp. 302-304.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GAINS FOR FRANCE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided France and Western Europe the precious years needed to regain their depleted strength. But NATO offered its members more than just military security. Shortly after the integrated military force concept was approved by the North Atlantic Council, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), was designated to be in France. With this decision and the future development of the "Infrastructure" to provide the forces with common facilities in Western Europe, a great financial boost was given to the national economies of the Europeans.

The first program for common facilities was established in 1950 and amounted to about \$90 million. At that time most of the airfields and communications networks which constituted the bulk of the program were to be set up in France and the Netherlands. The first program was funded by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. France's share came to about 45% of the appropriation.²⁷ Subsequent programs have been funded by a common financing formula with all member states contributing. During the first eleven years of the program approximately \$3.5 billion have been allocated for facilities.²⁸

The cost sharing formula was established on the following criteria: (1) contributive capacity of the member countries, (2) advantage that accrues to the using country, and (3) economic benefit

²⁷NATO Information Service, op. cit., p. 121.

²⁸Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960's, p. 139.

for the country in which the facility is placed. In the programs after the first year, France has contributed from 12% to 15% of the total expenditures. This amount placed France second only to the United States, until the entry of West Germany into NATO. Since 1961, the United States and West Germany have been carrying 50% of the financial burden of the infrastructure programs.²⁹

During the first five years more than half of the money was devoted to the building of airdrome facilities. By 1954, the number of airfields available to the allied air forces had risen from 20 to over 120. Today this number exceeds 220. In addition to airfields, the infrastructure includes approximately 5,000 miles of pipeline for fuels, and 27,000 miles of signal communications.³⁰ Recently, the emphasis has been placed on air defense equipment, missile sites, and storage areas for nuclear weapons.

The economic importance of the NATO Infrastructure to France cannot be minimized. Because of her geographical position and size, France has been the host country to most of the facilities. The United States alone has 29 installations in France even though the vast majority of the US troops are located elsewhere in Europe.³¹

France has enjoyed an influx of foreign exchange due to the vast building programs sponsored by other countries but located in

²⁹NATO Information Service, op. cit., p. 123 (chart).

³⁰GB Central Information Office, Alliance for Peace, p. 20.

³¹"France's Strategic Position in NATO," Map, New York Times, 6 Jun. 1965, p. E2.

France. The local employment situation is not only favorably affected during the construction period but also during the operation period for maintenance and service. Although all construction is subject to international competitive bidding, the architectural and engineering aspects of the project are normally undertaken by professionals of the host country.³²

Inasmuch as requirements for airfields have changed over the life of NATO, many airfields previously built with common funding are no longer needed. The host country automatically falls heir to these facilities.³³ When the assets and the liabilities of the common Infrastructure are weighed against each other, country by country, the assets far outdistance the liabilities economically and financially. Considering the 12% to 15% contributions made by France, the return has been bountiful.

In addition to the many financial benefits derived through the Infrastructure program, France received the lion's share of the United States off-shore procurement orders in the early 1950's. During the Truman Administration more than \$700 million of such orders were placed in Western Europe, with France receiving contracts totalling \$335 million. In 1952 alone, France was allocated more than half of the \$1 billion worth of orders placed.³⁴

³²U.S. Dept of Commerce, FC 2224-RIW, Sep. 1960.

³³NATO Information Service, op. cit., p. 124.

³⁴"Economic Cooperation with France," Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1783, PL 472, 80th Congress, June 28, 1948, p. 7, No. 2023, and pp. 48-49, No. 1783. To better understand the importance of the mutual help aspects of NATO, see also, Ronald S. Ritchie, NATO, The Economics of an Alliance, p. 65.

* * * * *

From the troubled years immediately after the surrender of Germany to the Allies until today, Western Europe has gone through a complete transformation. The United States of Europe has not emerged, but the principles of Monnet's concept have been tried. The art of coalition has been exercised in the technical, financial, and economic fields, in addition to that of the pure military. France, above all other participants, can attest to the success of these joint ventures. From a struggling, devastated land, plagued with political factionalism, France has not only survived the enormous drain of the Far East and Algerian wars, but has risen to the plateau from which the call for leadership of Europe is being broadcast. Surely, France's rise "Up from the Ashes" has been prodigious.

CHAPTER 3

APRES MOI, LE DELUGE

Any system consisting in the transfer of our sovereignty to international bodies would be incompatible with the rights and duties of the French Republic.

--De Gaulle

Coalitions are born in time of need, flourish when danger persists, and will tend to dissolve in times of peace and prosperity. Throughout this gambit, the political climate may change frequently. In the final analysis, the fate of all coalitions rests on political decisions. The great economic and military coalitions of the post-war period may not be on the brink of disintegration, but their stability is being challenged. President de Gaulle contends that France was forced into the Rome agreements because she had not yet recovered economically.¹ Politically, France defeated the European Defense Community by her indecision and vacillation. On the military side, the French decisions against NATO since the late 1950's, are indications that De Gaulle believes France is fully strong enough to make herself head and understood despite the opposition of the United States and Britain. The trend in France is away from the multilateral agreement; economic, military, and definitely political.

¹Charles de Gaulle, Twelfth Press Conference, 9 Sep. 1965 (hereafter referred to as De Gaulle, 12th P.C.).

PROSPERITY--ANTI-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)

Of the three types of coalitions, France is less hostile to one based on an economic partnership. The hostility that does exist, is in recognition of a fear that the Community concept will progress to its ultimate form of political unity.

From the start, De Gaulle has been unenthusiastic about Monnet's Europe. Although not in power at the time, he opposed the Schuman Plan and subsequent formation of the European Community for Coal and Steel (ECCS). When the ECCS was expanded to produce the European Economic Community (EEC), De Gaulle's support was negligible. From time to time his attitude changes to one of toleration for the economic communities, in order to keep the other members bound to France, striving constantly to develop an old-fashioned alliance under French hegemony.²

An attempt was made to strengthen the three established Communities by a fusion of the executives into a single unit. France, under De Gaulle, prevented the action. He has opposed the European University being placed under the domination of the Community institutions.³

²John Pinder, Europe Against De Gaulle, p. 31.

³Ibid., p. 32. A committee set up by the Six countries of the European Economic Community has recommended that a graduate college with five departments should be organized: mathematics, physics, economics, social studies, history, law, and courses of interest to the EEC agencies. The University was of interest to most of the countries. The forecast in 1960 was that it could be founded and in operation by 1962. By 1966 the University was expected to have 1,200 students and 250 staff and faculty personnel. As of this writing, no positive action has been taken for opening of classes. The World of Learning, 1963-64, p. 27.

It was France alone that vetoed Britain's entry into the Common Market, thereby making an expansion of the Community impossible at that time. The constantly growing indications of a break with the United States, not only in NATO but world politics, displays De Gaulle's hostility to the whole process of Monnet's revolution.

In the EEC, De Gaulle is dealing with other nation states, and lacking the state power he has when dealing with internal French matters, the means available for domination are somewhat limited. The threat of blocking progress desired by the majority, offering minor concessions followed by a major coup, putting an organization into cold storage, or causing its breakup, these are all French weapons of power diplomacy being used within the Community.

The most violent anti-coalition action taken by France was her boycott of the 26 July 1965 ministerial meeting of the Common Market.⁴ The crisis that arose was attributed to what France called, the "persistent reticence" of the other members of the EEC to include agriculture as well as industry in the scope of the Common Market. As the primary European exporter of agricultural products, the concern of France in this sphere is understandable. However, the agricultural aspect is a cover for a much deeper concern on the part of France and its President.

The basic issue is the possible loss of European domination by France, should the provisions of the Treaty of Rome be carried out.

⁴Waverly Root, "French 'No' on Market Underlined," Washington Post, 3 Jul. 1965, p. A7.

According to these agreements, beginning with 1 January 1966, the decisions of the councils of ministers of the Six are to be taken by majority vote. De Gaulle fears that such a ruling could lead to subordination of French policies and European leadership. Would not this mean the termination of the power diplomacy which has become the trademark of De Gaulle's France?

Prior to the French presidential election in December of 1965, De Gaulle offered four conditions for reentry into Common Market activities: (1) elimination of the majority vote feature from the Rome treaty, (2) entry of agriculture into the Common Market, (3) reshaping the whole organization of the EEC, with particular emphasis on reducing the authority and role of the Executive Commission, and (4) acceptance for the EEC a formula consisting of a "Europe of States" rather than a supranational organization.⁵ Failing to achieve a simple majority of votes in the first election, President de Gaulle may well have recognized the impact of his policies on the French people who have fared so well in the Community atmosphere. However, based on past performance, it is unlikely that extensive concessions to the Five will be offered.

In comparing De Gaulle, "the Man who is France," with Monnet, the "Father of Europe," one might say they are both Frenchmen. At this point the similarity ends. Monnet planned for a democratic community in which no one people would dominate, whereas De Gaulle

⁵De Gaulle, 12th P.C., pp. 3-6.

is attempting to reestablish the old power balance of states led by France. Monnet's concept included a place for Britain in the Community and an ever-strengthening partnership with America, but De Gaulle has blocked, at least for the present, the acceptance of Britain into the Community, and is working toward the weakening of ties with the United States. De Gaulle hopes to bargain with the Communists independently of the United States, whereas Monnet sought to do so on a basis of Atlantic partnership.⁶ Monnet is for coalition; De Gaulle is against it.

POLITICS--ANTI-EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY (EDC)

French diplomacy changed three times from 1944 until 1950. Initially, France tried to be the mediator between the Communists and the Western allies. By 1947 French diplomacy had firmly but reluctantly placed France in the Western camp. The launching of the European coal and steel pool in 1950 marked yet a third phase of diplomacy.⁷ In the Schuman Plan, France was endeavoring to make her own positive contribution to European and Western reconstruction. The same country was responsible for the defeat of the second major attempt at bringing Europe closer to an integrated third force. After four years of debate, the French National Assembly rejected the European Defense Community (EDC).

⁶Pinder, op. cit., p. 41.

⁷Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, France Defeats EDC, p. 3.

Although the ECCS was conceived to unite Europe and regain power equal to the United States and Russia, the Korean War rapidly influenced its direction. Almost immediately, it became the symbol of the West preparing to defend itself against a Soviet threat. At the same time, American diplomats and military advisors were demanding the rearming of Germany. Most Europeans recognized the need for German help. Nevertheless, many, and particularly the French, were against the reinstitution of the Wehrmacht.

The EDC, often referred to as the Pleven Plan, was proposed as a compromise. This plan called for the formation of an armament pool on the same model as the ECCS. The Pleven Plan carefully avoided terms such as Wehrmacht and German rearmament. In their place it spoke of German divisions in the European Army and German participation in the defense of Europe.⁸ This was the beginning of the EDC. The Pleven Plan method was an answer to the American demand for German rearmament. It also limited equality to the European Community, and prevented the entry of Germany into the Atlantic Community.

All of the Six, except France, agreed to establish a European Defense Community.⁹ President Truman and Dean Acheson accepted the EDC project and many American leaders became the warm supporters of the plan both here and abroad. All that remained was to "sell" the French Assembly.

⁸Ibid., p. 4.

⁹Pinder, op. cit., p. 60.

Although opposition to German rearmament was always strong in the French National Assembly, a new stumbling block appeared. By the end of 1951 the strong Gaullist party decided that a German army was preferable to the loss of French military sovereignty. The great debate had begun, and each month seemed to be working against acceptance of the EDC.

The treaty that was to establish the EDC was initiated by Prime Minister Pinay of France in 1952, two years after its proposal. Six months later it was sent to the French Parliament for ratification. The final vote was taken in August of 1954 in which the EDC was ruled out.

It was the French delay that brought on the defeat of the EDC. On the domestic scene, new French governments were constantly being formed, which changed the balance of political power. Throughout the decisive period, the Socialists, who were favorable to ratification, belonged to the opposition. The Gaullists, although split between the majority and the opposition, were unanimously against the EDC.¹⁰

After four years the international scene had also changed. Military operations had come to an end in Korea, and the threat of a general war had waned. The death of Stalin and the attitude of his successors seemed to relieve some of the anxiety felt four years earlier. All of these impressions, brought on by the lapse of time, made German rearmament less urgent and even less acceptable.

¹⁰Lerner and Aron, op. cit., p. 8.

When France rejected the treaty for the European Defense Community in 1954, most competent observers thought unity in Europe was dead and buried.¹¹ France, the sponsor of this direct assault on the citadel of national sovereignty through the integration of the armed forces, proved in the final analysis to be the force that performed the political coup de grace.

PEACE--ANTI-NATO

The French position on NATO was recently expressed by President de Gaulle while addressing the Ecole Militaire in Paris when he said: "A defense system in which France can no longer be herself is unthinkable and the system of integration which prevailed at one time is finished."¹² With this as a base, France has begun its anti-coalition action against NATO.

The underrating of France within NATO has been the constant irritation of President de Gaulle as well as his predecessors in the Fourth Republic. During the December 1958 meeting of the NATO Council, France presented three specific demands: (1) the formation of a "Political Directorate" consisting of France, Great Britain, and the United States which would act on all important matters; (2) this directorate would have world-wide interest rather than being confined to the geographical limits of NATO; and (3) France would be

¹¹Jean Monnet, Address in acceptance of Freedom Award, p. 3.

¹²Stanley Clark, as cited in The Man Who Is France, p. 236.

given greater responsibility in the command structure of NATO.¹³ The French demands were met with indifference and no action was forthcoming.

From that date until the present, French support of NATO has continued to deteriorate. The first action was to pull part of the French Fleet out from under the NATO Commander in the Mediterranean. Shortly thereafter, De Gaulle announced that missile bases and nuclear warheads would no longer be permitted on French soil. This restriction forced the immediate relocation of those air force units charged with the mission of nuclear weapons delivery from France to more exposed airfields in Germany. The next step was the withdrawal of the French tactical air forces and the declaration that France would not participate in any unified air defense measures with NATO.¹⁴

In the early planning stages for NATO, it was decided that almost 100 divisions of ground troops, with adequate ground support, would be required to withstand a full-scale Russian attack against

¹³"Final Communique of the NATO Council Ministerial Meeting, Paris, 18 Dec. 1958," Documents on International Affairs, 1958, p. 375. The United States reaction to the French proposal for closer consultations among the "Big Three" members of NATO is covered in greater detail in the statement of John Foster Dulles, Dept of State Pub. No. 7322, Apr. 1962, Document 133, p. 847. The command aspect of the proposition is best covered in Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "France Under De Gaulle," Headline Series, No. 139, Jan.-Feb. 1960.

¹⁴"France-NATO," Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. No. XII, 1959-1960, p. 16961. For De Gaulle's opinions on why French power cannot be tied down by commitment to NATO. See also Hatch, Alden. The De Gaulle Nobody Knows, p. 250.

West Germany. As the political and technological atmosphere has changed during the past fifteen years, this requirement has been reduced to a target of thirty, first echelon divisions, plus reserves. Even this target figure has never been met.¹⁵

France was originally committed to four army divisions under NATO command and control.¹⁶ The United States has insisted that all members of the Alliance must increase their contribution to the collective security effort. France has adamantly refused to give more than two divisions, and even this is done begrudgingly.

In 1961, France opposed the creation of a subordinate Atlantic command. The purpose of this proposal was to merge the Iberian area with the Western Mediterranean Command. Additionally, De Gaulle requested that this new area be placed under French command. This latter request appears reasonable when considering that throughout NATO's sixteen years of existence, French officers have never held more than one of the ten principal subordinate commands.¹⁷ The proposal was not accepted. In 1964, the French Government announced that its Atlantic naval forces previously earmarked for NATO were no longer so designated.

On 31 May 1965, France struck another blow at NATO by refusing to participate in military exercises scheduled for 1966. These

¹⁵Max S. Johnson, "If France Pulls Out--The Future of NATO," US News and World Report, 27 Sep. 1965, p. 40.

¹⁶Richard L. Worsnop, "French Policy Under De Gaulle," Editorial Research Reports, Vol. II, 20 Nov. 1963, pp. 854-855.

¹⁷Paul Finley, Speech, "How Subordinate is France in NATO," Foreign Policy Council, as cited in Freedom and Union, Nov. 1965, p. 20.

exercises were based on the American strategic doctrine of a phased response, which envisions graduated retaliations to the various forms of attack. Inasmuch as this strategy differs from that proposed by De Gaulle, which demands instant nuclear retaliation for a large or a small aggression, the French refused to play.¹⁸

French hostility frequently has been directed at the system of integrated command that existed in NATO.¹⁹ This system that provided a Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) presided over in turn since 1951 by American Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, Gruenther, Norstad, and Lemnitzer, has been particularly offensive to De Gaulle. Any integration of French troops or officers into a mongrel army has offended De Gaulle's idea of French independence.

Although the French have been criticized by many of the members of the Atlantic Alliance for their recent attacks on NATO, they are within their rights according to the Charter. Article XII of the treaty, signed in 1949, provides that after it has been in force ten years "the parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area."²⁰ Under this article France has the right to call for a review at this time, however, her actions can hardly be called consultatory.

¹⁸Pierre Messmer, Interview, W. German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1 Oct. 1965, p. 235.

¹⁹Drew Middleton, "NATO's Critical Hour," New York Times, 12 Jun. 1965, p. 10.

²⁰NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic Treaty, Appendix 4.

Article XIII of the Treaty states that after the Treaty has been in force for 20 years, that is by 1969, "any party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States."²¹ The French actions seem to be falling somewhere in between these two articles. De Gaulle has indicated rather positively his dislike for the organization of the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, he knows that security for NATO and Europe rests with the strong American potential.²² Regarding this aspect De Gaulle said:

. . . . As long as we judge necessary the solidarity of the Western peoples for the eventual defense of Europe, we will remain the allies of our allies, but at the expiration of the commitments which we made in the past, this is to say 1969 at the latest, there will end, so far as we are concerned, the subordination described as integration foreseen by NATO, which puts our destiny into foreign hands.²³

The French moves against NATO now include the basic structure of NATO, which is based on the concept of collective security. Defense Minister Pierre Messmer in July 1965, served notice that France will make her own decisions on basic defense strategy independent of the combined judgment of the North Atlantic Council.

France has already withdrawn French combat forces for all practical purposes from the allied command. French members of the integrated staff at Supreme Headquarters of NATO were ordered not to

²¹Ibid.

²²Adolf E. Heusinger, Interview, US News and World Report, 23 Aug. 1965, p. 55.

²³De Gaulle, 12th P.C., p. 7.

participate in the preparation of the joint military exercise in the autumn of 1965. No French military units were authorized to take part in this routine NATO exercise.²⁴ The final bid for realignment of authority came in October of 1965 when France gave notice that it means to end the situation that permits foreign forces to operate from her territory without regard for French sovereignty over French soil.²⁵ This statement has caused great concern among members of the Atlantic Alliance, which threat if carried out would require relocation of SHAPE and American lines of communication now in France.

* * * * *

The Community concepts in force and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have brought peace and prosperity to Western Europe. France has been one of the foremost beneficiaries. There can be no doubt that France is moving away from the various organizations that have brought her to the place she now holds. The French outlook toward coalitions in general, and NATO in particular, seems to recall the situation that opposing politicians found when they visited De Gaulle just prior to the formation of the Fifth Republic. They had expected to meet with the stern soldier of the Liberation. In his place they met a charming gentleman, reasonable and willing to compromise on everything--everything that did not matter.²⁶

²⁴Arthur Olsen, "France Boycotts Planning by NATO," New York Times, 28 Jul. 1965, p. 5.

²⁵Waverly Root, "Paris to File NATO De-integration," Washington Post, 7 Oct. 1965, p. A19.

The indicators are clear, the leadership is determined, but is this the time to release the deluge?

CHAPTER 4

OF COURSE, I AM FRANCE!

In the present military circumstances no nation can pretend to a place in the councils of the great powers unless it has the atomic bomb. --Even if it is a very little one.

--De Gaulle

Three primary drives have placed France on its course of nationalistic independence; the aspiration to regain world power status, the propensity to secure European leadership, and a desire to be the initial link between East and West in Europe. It is impossible to separate each of these from the other, for cementing them tightly together into a cohesive whole is Charles de Gaulle. Taken together these provide the motive that has brought France to the point of challenge.

The entire political climate of France has changed under the domination of President de Gaulle. It has been his policy to operate in a political vacuum. He maintains an independence of the parliament which the Gaullist party (UNR) controls, as well as an independence of public opinion. During the Fourth Republic with its multiparty-type rule, France had a political system without national

¹Alden Hatch, The De Gaulle Nobody Knows, p. 15. Sixty years ago, in a big old-fashioned apartment in the city of Paris, four young boys were playing with their lead soldiers. They were fighting real battles based on Napoleon's victories. Each brother represented a different nation. Ten-year-old Charles assigned them their roles. "You Xavier, are Austria, Jacques, your are Prussia, Pierre is Italy. Of course, I am France."

power.² Since De Gaulle returned to power, France has had national power without politics, except for a flurry during the December 1965 presidential elections.

FOLLOW ME

To insure power, France must gather around her other nations that are weak enough to be dominated and yet, together with France, are strong enough to prove equal to the United States and Russia.³ In Western Europe only two countries could offer a challenge to France in her claim to leadership; Britain and Germany.

In order to maintain a position of power in relation to Germany, France entered into the various Community arrangements that previously have been discussed. When preliminary discussions were entered into concerning the Schuman Plan, the smaller nations looked to France and Britain as the only possible counterweights to Germany. Initially, Britain was reluctant to take part in the Community projects. If the venture was to be at all possible, French participation was essential. This advantage gave France the strong bargaining position she now holds within the Six. This also explains, to some extent, why the other five are unable to progress with future Community projects whenever the French government does not agree.

After the French veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market, there was cause to believe that this was the result of a personal

²Roscoe Drummond, "Unsinkable de Gaulle . . ." New York Herald Tribune, 8 Oct. 1965, p. 31 (hereafter referred to as Drummond, Unsinkable).

³John Pinder, Europe Against de Gaulle, p. 39.

antipathy toward the British by President de Gaulle. Despite the wartime slights of De Gaulle and the immense debt he owes to Britain for their support during World War II, Britain's major crime is to be as powerful as France and therefore in a position to wrest the leadership from her. Britain's acceptance into any of the European Community ventures will ruin the hegemony that France wishes not only to retain, but to strengthen. If Britain is eventually accepted into the Common Market, it will be with French insistence on the unanimity rule for policy decisions and not on the Rome agreement for rule by majority in 1966.

As France continues to deal with some success with the inward challenges of her leadership of Europe, she is devoting much of her energy to the threat from the outside--the United States. This accounts for the attack on NATO. President de Gaulle does not attack the Atlantic Alliance because he wants to be sure of the presence of the United States in Europe in time of war. However, he wants to dissolve NATO as it exists today, because he wants United States influence out of Europe in time of peace.⁴

It is difficult to consider France a full working member of the Atlantic Alliance. Recent participation, or the lack of it, has reduced her to associate or observer status. De Gaulle seems to be attempting to split the Alliance and make an "exclusive club" of the Six. It would suit the French hegemony scheme to have separate

⁴Roscoe Drummond, "De Gaulle vs. Europe," New York Herald Tribune, 10 Oct. 1965, p. 22.

operational plans, strategic concepts, and command functions for the six Common Market countries. Nuclear support would be provided by the French "force de frappe," adding to the dominant position held by France.⁵

ROOM AT THE TOP

In 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed an agreement acknowledging General de Gaulle as the Chief of the Free French everywhere, and promising "the integral restoration of independence and greatness to France." De Gaulle personally wrote in the word "greatness."⁶ From that day forward, France, with the drive and unswerving dedication of Charles de Gaulle, has been striving to recapture a place at the top in world political power.

By mid-1960 President de Gaulle had been returned to power for only 18 months. Even by this time her efforts toward the goal of remaking France a world power were marked. He could justly claim to have given France a stable government in lieu of the revolving door cabinet crisis of the past which had made her appear weak and ineffectual to the nations of the world. He had arrested a dangerous inflationary trend and steadied the country's economy and trade. Important oil fields had been discovered in the Sahara and De Gaulle had pushed for their development to free France from the Middle East

⁵Dirk Stikker, Address, "The Stiff Medicine NATO Needs," Hartford University.

⁶Hatch, op. cit., p. 112.

yoke of the past. Through personal effort, De Gaulle had improved relations with the USSR, a relationship which has continued to improve each year since then.⁷

France, through the persistence of President de Gaulle, maintained the right to develop her own nuclear capability. In defiance to her NATO allies, and the USSR, France continued to build nuclear weapons and a small delivery force. With equal determination, France has refused to become involved in any sharing or turning over of her weapons to a multilateral force, under what she considers to be a foreign command.

Late in November of 1965, France placed into orbit her first space capsule. The capsule was relatively small and did nothing but emit a radio signal. Of importance to France is that she became the third nation in the space race. France plans to orbit seven satellites by 1970. Some of these shots will be made from the United States or on US launch vehicles.⁸ These facts do not deter France in her effort to be counted among the leaders in the Space Age.

Perhaps one way of attaining recognition as a world power is to speak out boldly against the actions and policies of other recognized leaders. France has used this technique on numerous occasions, particularly against the United States. Our policies in Vietnam

⁷Stanley Clark, The Man Who Is France, p. 240.

⁸Peter Braestrup, "France to Orbit First Satellite," New York Times, 21 Nov. 1965, p. 27.

have been constantly under attack by the French President. The one thing for which De Gaulle would never forgive the United States is to win in Vietnam. French recognition of Red China was an attempt to gain influence in Southeast Asia to the detriment of the United States effort there.⁹ The French position on the payment problem for peacekeeping operations by the United Nations is but another strike at the United States in the world forum.

TO THE URALS

At his news conference on 4 February 1965, President de Gaulle stated,

. . . everything can be reduced to three closely linked questions: to see that Germany henceforth becomes a definite element of progress and peace; on this condition, to help with her reunification; and to make a start and to select a framework that would make this possible.¹⁰

In this statement, De Gaulle was giving the ground rules he considers important in the reunification problem.

Of more importance than the French ground rules, was the suggested working party to determine the future of Germany. On this De Gaulle commented that France and the Soviet Union, with Germany's neighbors, should be the group concerned. By eliminating both the United States and Britain from this select group, one must assume

⁹Charles de Gaulle, Ninth Press Conference, 31 Jan. 1964. For direct coverage of the Vietnam situation see Charles de Gaulle, Statement on Vietnam, 29 Aug. 1963.

¹⁰Charles de Gaulle, Eleventh Press Conference, 4 Feb. 1965.

that France has elevated herself to the highest power level attainable. Certainly, her importance or her contribution to the Allies during World War II would never place her on the throne of judgment for a once defeated Germany.

The key in this situation is that perhaps De Gaulle has reached a watershed in French foreign policy. Since that time, French policy statements have been indicating a much more independent attitude within NATO and the Community projects, and toward a more flexible relationship with the Communist bloc. With the German reunification problem as an entre, France appears in the vanguard to end "Iron Curtain" thinking, and to evolve more liberal political attitudes toward Eastern Europe.

In addition to applying the German wedge, France is also looking to the East for economic gains and expansion. For this venture France is in concert with the Austrians. Together they are working for trade expansion and a relaxation of tension between the East and the West.¹¹ To assume that the United States is not interested in the same objectives would be incorrect. However, whereas the United States maintains the same high protective tariffs of three decades ago against all bloc countries except Poland, France offers the same reduced tariff rates to the Communist nations as to the non-Communist ones.¹² It is not beyond the realm of reality to expect a Common Market which would one day include the Urals, and France would prefer to play the leading role.

¹¹Waverly Root, "French 'No' on Market Underlined," Washington Post, 3 Jul. 1965, p. A7.

¹²"Unfreezing East-West Trade," New York Times, 20 Nov. 1965, p. 34M.

LE GRAND CHARLES

To consider French domestic and foreign policies during and since World War II without Charles de Gaulle is inconceivable. On 1 June 1958, Charles de Gaulle was swept back into power in an incredible bloodless revolution. There seemed to be little change in progress from where he had left the government in 1946. Although the return to the seat of power was a long planned operation, De Gaulle made his acceptance seem hesitant. This hesitance was to demonstrate to his countrymen that he was capable of standing aloof if conditions for control were not to his liking. He had, in fact, proved to France that he would move from retirement only if France would call him. This is the real De Gaulle--confident as a man can be who belongs to no one and to everyone.¹³

This degree of confidence can be found in Alexander, who called it his "hope," or in Caesar's "luck," or Napoleon's "star." Whether De Gaulle wishes to be considered by historians on this level of greatness is not important. However, he has assured himself of prestige, and with this prestige an exceptional amount of mystery. The mystery that surrounds De Gaulle's projects, methods of operation, and his private life, intrigues everyone. De Gaulle's domination over people is not achieved by shutting himself off from them, but on the contrary. His modus operandi in public requires that everyone see him, and that each one thinks himself seen by "Le grand Charles."¹⁴

¹³Clark, op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁴Hatch, op. cit., p. 62.

The mystique of De Gaulle carries over into his administration of the Fifth Republic. Although all of the basic freedoms have been preserved for the French under De Gaulle, there is a decided lack of public debate on French policies. The December 1965 election provided a slim ray of hope in cracking the "De Gaulle Curtain." All of the sensational actions and pronouncements made by De Gaulle are kept secret until he makes the disclosure. They are kept secret from the world and from the people of France. There can seldom be any debate or critical questioning in the press, because there is never any advance information. France and the world are confronted with accomplished facts. At this juncture, the actions may be discussed but not changed.

Several factors contribute to De Gaulle's support by the French voters. Those Frenchmen who remember the Fourth Republic do not wish to return to the windmilling government it produced. To say the very least, De Gaulle has given stability to the administration. The French economy is prosperous, and prosperity is difficult to outvote. The social welfare budget of France has nearly doubled in seven years.¹⁵ As noted in the 1965 election, the weakened political parties are still divided. To win, there must emerge a united opposition to De Gaulle or a candidate of equal prestige and strength, neither of which seems possible in the near future. Lastly, the

¹⁵Drummond, Unsinkable, p. 31.

French voter tends to relish De Gaulle's grand assertion of French national interests.

De Gaulle is certainly not an opportunist just on his own account, as one might find among many Latin American dictators. If this were the case, his influence would not survive his political demise. He is, on the other hand, an opportunist for France. It is the aim of De Gaulle to play a role in world politics, and this is unquestionably a French role. It is this desire that leads him to try to insert himself wherever possible.¹⁶ With these goals, his political influence will long survive him on the European plane, whereas any personal autocracy would not.

* * * * *

As the three compelling drives move France toward European and Atlantic independence with ever-increasing crescendo, it may well be time for leader and people to take stock of the country's capabilities. The drives as analyzed above are real and cannot be discounted as myths. In pursuit of these goals, France has indicated the need for revision, if not complete rejection, of many of the institutions set up by multilateral agreement. The time for consultation toward revision of previous agreements may well be at hand. The French methodology for accomplishment is nevertheless open to

¹⁶Adolph E. Heusinger, Interview, US News and World Report, 23 Aug. 1965, p. 55.

suspect. To speak and act as a giant, one must be a giant. There is a lot of difference between a small giant and a large man.

CHAPTER 5

GO IT ALONE

And the effects of modern nuclear warfare, no less than the realization that isolationism is impossible even for the most powerful, means that no nation, however great, can think in terms of going it alone, without allies and without regard to world opinion.

--Harold Wilson

To determine the capability of France to stand alone in the world community, is much the same as determining the winner of an election before the votes have been cast. To do either, one must make certain assumptions, and then carefully analyze the indicators which might forecast the unknown. As has been indicated throughout this paper, it is incorrect, if not impossible, to disassociate the military and economic ties that have bound France with her allies for more than a decade. For purpose of analysis, it will be assumed that France will continue her anti-coalition efforts and by mid-1966 completely cut all ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community organizations. Under such circumstances, will France retain the power position she now enjoys? Will French prosperity and social betterment continue? Can France hope to defend herself militarily?

ECONOMIC POWER

The most important credit that France enjoys over her European neighbors, is the simple fact that she can feed herself. This, none

of the others can do. It is also this fact that has made agriculture integration in the Common Market the economic battle cry of France. In or out of the Common Market, French farm production would probably remain much the same. The important difference if France were no longer a part of the Six would be the competitive market. French farm exports would be available to the world on an equal basis with those of the United States, Canada, and Australia, to name just a few.

Up until June 30, 1965, France enjoyed certain agricultural financing provisions within the Common Market. One example of this was the use of the Common Market fund to cover 50% of the deficit on her low-priced sales of surplus wheat to Red China and the Soviet Union. This turned out to be a painless way to subsidize one's foreign policy.¹

Perhaps the best indicator of French economic power potential is its trade with the world. Before the establishment of the Common Market France's best customers were West Germany, the Benelux countries, and Great Britain. The major exporters to France were the United States, West Germany, and the Benelux. During the years immediately following World War II, France carried a heavy foreign trade deficit. By 1955 French exports almost matched the amount of imports. In 1956 and 1957, which were extremely bad years, the deficits in trade exceeded one billion dollars. With the help of

¹Waverly Root, "French 'No' on Market Underlined," Washington Post, 3 Jul. 1965, p. A7.

financial aid totaling 650 million dollars, the largest amount coming from the United States, the international position of the franc was strengthened.² This action plus the institution of the Common Market gave France a new lease on trade. For each of the next four years France was able to post a surplus trade balance in the neighborhood of 45 million dollars. However, beginning with 1962, the trade balance again moved into the deficit column ranging from approximately 50 to 100 million dollars annually.³

Since 1962, the major portion of French trade has been with nonmembers of the EEC. Trade within the EEC by mid-1965 has reached 650 million dollars, whereas trade without had climbed to over one billion dollars. In dealing with the member countries, France has been able to nearly balance her import-export ratio. But this condition is just reversed in her trade relations with nonmembers of EEC.⁴ Should France no longer enjoy the stabilizing influence of the Common Market, the effect of this top heavy import trade situation would magnify the deficit trend already established, causing rapid deterioration of the entire economy.

One of the benefits that a Community member may receive is mutual aid from its fellow-members in time of economic stress. The record shows that not all members of the EEC are simultaneously

²French Embassy, France from Reconstruction to Expansion 1948-1958.

³Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Surveys by the OECD, France, July 1963 and July 1965.

⁴European Economic Community Commission, The Economic Situation in the Community, 1965, p. 71, charts 5 and 6.

caught by the same economic disturbances. As a point in fact, during 1963 and 1964 both France and Italy had large trade deficits, whereas Germany had a huge surplus. For the last two years the Commission has been working on procedures to provide mutual assistance and other steps that would bring relief to a troubled partner.⁵ Without the EEC, France would have to rely on outside aid. The United States has always been a willing donor to the ailing financial systems of its allies. With the United States-France relationship already strained, the Congress may be less willing to be the note-holder for a France that has canceled her treaty obligations.

In comparing the indices of Gross National Product growth among the Community nations since 1958, France falls well behind Germany and Italy, and just barely above the Netherlands.⁶ A more meaningful comparison, would be to place France in judgment with one relatively equal country in the Community and with one nonmember country. Considering strategic indicators such as national income per head of population, defense expenditures per head of population, percent of active male population in the armed forces, and the size of the armed forces, France, Germany and England are good samples.⁷ This comparison remains valid with France as a member of the EEC. Without the economic advantages of the Common Market, France would fall far behind Germany and Britain. Germany would find its position

⁵Miriam Camps, What Kind of Europe . . . ?, p. 78.

⁶EECC, op. cit., pp. 58, 72, 88, 102, and 116.

⁷Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, p. 41.

in Europe greatly strengthened by the elimination of France from the EEC competition, where already Germany has taken over the industrial lead. Britain, although not yet a member of the EEC, has a strong Commonwealth economic bond compared to the relatively weak French Community of States made up of former African colonies. France could find its newly developing Community countries more of a financial liability than an asset if metropolitan France were to experience economic difficulties.

To offset the trade loss by disassociation with the Common Market, France might well turn to seek economic ties with the Communist bloc, particularly in Eastern Europe. This could prove to be a stop-gap measure, but in the long run France would find herself out of the hard currency market. This process would be quickened due to the lack of heavy investment dollars from the United States, which it received in the past.⁸ De Gaulle could find his recently amassed gold hoard being used up in exchange for dollars or other Western currencies.

MILITARY STRENGTH

The military side of the picture for a France that has cast away the shield of protection now furnished by NATO is equally grim. The French armed forces total 620,000, of which 415,000 are in the Army. The elite of the Army is contained in the "forces de manoeuvre" made up of six divisions, all located in Europe. Two

⁸End of the French 'Miracle,'" US News and World Report, 7 Jun. 1965, p. 81.

divisions of this force are in Germany and, for the present, assigned to NATO. Except for about 13,000 Army forces stationed at various bases in the French Community States, the remainder are members of the "forces du territoire," organized into regiments and brigades and located throughout France on a regional basis.

The French Navy, by far the smallest service, has received much less of the defense budget than the Army or the Air Force. Four aircraft carriers, two cruisers, sixty destroyers, and twenty-two submarines make up the major ship list of the Navy. Inasmuch as French foreign policy in practice has constantly been shifting to a strong metropole position and away from global commitments, it is fair to say that the French Navy has had a much reduced mission since the conclusions of the Indochinese and Algerian insurgencies.

The main French effort in defense, has been the development of her Strategic Air Command and associated nuclear weapons system ("force de frappe"). The backbone of France's SAC is the Mirage IV which is capable of carrying a 60 KT fission bomb. France plans to build fifty of these aircraft, of which 24 are now operational. In addition to this Command, the Air Force has a modest Air Defense Command, two Tactical Air Forces, and an Air Transport Command.⁹

France without allies would find its military establishment adequate for defense against most of its neighbors in a conventional conflict. Belgium, Italy, and Spain could probably be successfully

⁹Institute for Strategic Studies, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

repulsed individually or simultaneously. On the same level of conflict, it is questionable whether France could defend herself against Germany whose army is larger and better trained at this time. By the use of nuclear weapons, France is thought to have the edge over Germany, assuming Germany had none. But these neighbors do not constitute the threat. These nations are friends, if not allies, but the comparison is worthwhile to indicate the order of magnitude of French defense capability.

If the main threat to France is from the Communist bloc countries to the East, she certainly enjoys the best location of the Six. If the conflict remains nonnuclear, Communist forces must pass through Germany and the Low Countries prior to engaging France. If the conflict becomes nuclear, France is only less vulnerable because of her size. This would be of little significance against massive Russian nuclear attacks.

And what can be done with fifty Mirage IV bombers? Their greatest weaknesses lie in range and speed at tree-top flight level. This is the flight envelope required to get past enemy radar. At 100 yards off the ground, the speed of the Mirage IV drops from Mach 2.2 to Mach 1.2, with a great decrease in the radius of action. This limited range factor resulted in the purchase of 12 KC 135 tankers from the United States.¹⁰ Given the facts, the "force de frappe" alone does not present a significant threat to a power like the USSR.

¹⁰Alexandre Sanquinetti, Statement made before the Anglo-American Press Association, Paris. Cited in Washington Post, 7 May 1965, p. A12.

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The sounds of France alone do not resemble the cries of the challenge for power being broadcast by President de Gaulle. Militarily and economically, France stands as a good solid second class power. Alone, France can never hope to reach the power level of the USSR or the United States, or perhaps China in two or three decades.

De Gaulle's desperate attempt to push France into the atomic power class with its "force de frappe" has been but a futile gesture. This experiment in thermonuclear weaponry should have emphasized the lessons of economics that go into this type of technology. France may relish being a nuclear power for the present but her capability for sustaining nuclear warfare or providing a credible nuclear deterrent is negligible.¹¹

Without a healthy economy, a strategic strike force and a credible military defense establishment are impossible to maintain. France cannot hope for a prosperous economy without the aid of the European Communities. To lose this support might in the long run be more detrimental to France than losing the protection of NATO.

France has an important geographic position in Europe. To NATO it means strength in depth and needed maneuver area. To France without NATO it means a position of relative security. Security in the fact that an attack from Communist European countries from the East must pass through Germany before reaching her soil.

¹¹Harold Wilson, Address to NATO ministerial meeting, 11 May 1965.

CHAPTER 6

THE YEAR OF THE CRUNCH

We others have small faults because we have small qualities. You, however, General, are a man of great qualities.

--Father Abbe Pierre
(to Gen. de Gaulle)

France can, if she so chooses, stand alone in the world community of nations. France can survive and perhaps even grow economically, militarily, and socially, without the assistance of her present allies, but France will never achieve greatness. France will not sit as an equal with the USSR and the United States through her own achievements, regardless of the superstrength of President de Gaulle. France is at the crossroads, and it is time for serious thought before continuing.

Just as Western Europe has undergone a complete transformation in the past two decades, so has French policy. In 1946, military and economic help were desperately needed to forestall complete collapse. France eagerly accepted both. Success of NATO and the European Community ventures has brought strength, stability, and prosperity back to France. This has been the coalition story; military strength and economic power.

With peace and prosperity, coalitions tend to be restrictive. France has suddenly remembered her sovereignty and her distaste for "integration" and the loss of flexibility. Were these factors not

considered in Washington in 1949, in Paris in 1952, and in Rome in 1957? As the French President continues to place one obstacle after another to obstruct the progress of the Community projects and NATO, his intentions are clear. The French contributions in World War II, and as a partner in NATO should have given an indication of which road France would eventually take in any coalition.

The French motives of European leadership, world power status, and the East-West link, are not unreasonable in themselves. To attack her allies, and the organizations that have made France strong enough to have opted for such goals, is questionable. Being propelled along by the driving force of De Gaullism, France has failed to look at her capabilities to stand alone, should the anticoalition efforts succeed.

Economically, France could become another Spain or Sweden, without the benefits of the European Community for Coal and Steel, and the European Economic Community. The French trade imbalance will tend to increase if the Community ties are removed. Financial aid will not be readily available, or at least not in hard currency. The French Community of States offers little assistance to the French economy. The factors enumerated in this analysis tend to predict that France will not jeopardize her position in the Common Market or the ECCS, but will continue to press for advantages. For the concession of expansion of the Community, France will hope for a reversal on the majority rule agreement. Economically, France without these coalitions, has too much to lose.

Militarily France has offered very little to NATO except its location. The force commitments, as analyzed previously, have been small and constantly reduced. The "force de frappe" can hardly be considered a deterrent against nuclear attack by the USSR. On the other hand, what does France lose by not being part of NATO? France would lose the economic benefits it now gets from the NATO Infrastructure. As long as France is sure that NATO will exist with the United States and West Germany as two of the members, she can reasonably expect nuclear as well as conventional protection against Communist aggression. By leaving NATO France might expect an improvement in French-East European relations, which is one of the goals she seeks. From this analysis it is felt that France will continue to diminish its ties with NATO as rapidly as possible. For France and NATO, 1966 might well be the "year of the crunch."


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ADDENDUM

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Alliance of the West is bigger than
any of its members

--L. B. Johnson

The De Gaulle government of France is patently out of sympathy with the organic structure of the economic and military coalitions of the West, and has voiced its objections. Accepting the conclusions of this analysis, the situation in the economic Communities of the Six, although stalled for the present, is still hopefully soluable. The military coalition, NATO, presents a far more serious picture, and one which is perhaps of more concern to the United States and its foreign policy.

The question no longer concerns "France without NATO," but what should the United States do about the coming crisis? Two reasonable courses of action are open for consideration: (1) accept the French challenge and attempt to remake the alliance that would negate or prevent the French pull-out, or (2) plan for a NATO without France. There is no easy solution to either of these approaches, and both involve changes in our present political and military policies.

In stating the first course of action it is not meant to accept the De Gaulle plan for NATO, which at the present is known to nobody except De Gaulle, or to accept the concept of loose bilateral treaties that were failures in the past. What is meant is that the

United States should recognize the problem and seize the initiative in NATO reorganization--seek offensive measures instead of always being defensive against France and her proposals.

The United States has been speaking about equality in NATO; equality of effort, and equality of responsibility. President Kennedy spoke of a move toward an equal partnership. That was three years ago, but the formula has not been repeated since. If we want to follow this course of action, the first step toward success would be a personal meeting of Presidents de Gaulle and Johnson. The Presidents of France and the United States have not met for four years. If we are to take the offensive, President Johnson should be the one to propose the initial meeting.

This meeting should be followed as rapidly as possible with a top-level planning conference made up of members from all fifteen NATO countries. Based on the ideas of equality of effort and responsibility, this group of distinguished representatives would be charged with formulating plans for strategic decisionmaking, defense financing, military procurement, and research and development. Recognizing that the real problem in NATO, as seen by France, is that American predominance has persisted long after Europe revived, the following improvements might be suggested by the American delegation:

- (1) Reallocate the command positions in NATO to reflect a reasonable division among all nations. Consider a rotational concept of the top positions.

(2) Eliminate the present nuclear east system that exists in the Military Standing Group. France is a nuclear power, and being accepted for exchange of nuclear information in the Standing Group with the United States and Britain would grant some prestige.

(3) Strengthen NATO's control and authority over all weapons and forces assigned.

There is no assurance that these changes in policy would cause France and President de Gaulle to remain in NATO. If successful, there can be no doubt that this approach would be much less costly to the United States and much more desirable from a military point of view for NATO.

The second course of action requires less initiative and a great deal more money, at a time when the military budget is being drained by the Vietnam action. However, it is a feasible approach, and many will be forced upon the United States. This action would also begin with American efforts to call a meeting. This meeting, however, would be for President Johnson and all members of the North Atlantic Alliance. The objective would be twofold: (1) to make clear to all members of NATO that the onus for weakening NATO lies with France, and (2) that NATO will be maintained as a viable organization for the defense of Western Europe. These principles are important because De Gaulle believes that if France quits NATO, the organization will cease to exist. De Gaulle also feels that NATO without France is unworkable.

The United States must then reiterate its thesis that NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance are inseparable. If France quits NATO, the United States should not enter into a bilateral defense agreement with De Gaulle. This refusal would also force France to recognize that she has no guarantee of nuclear protection from the United States.

To retain NATO in this form may cause the United States to accept two facts that would require policy realignment. Europe will remain a divided continent between East and West, which will probably also prevent the reunification of Germany. Also, Western Europe will require a nuclear force of its own which would not fall under United States control.

If France can survive without NATO, NATO will certainly survive without France.

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